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FIRST AMENDMENT 
Accommodating Employees' Sabbaths: 
Is it the Government's Job? 
by Neal Devins 
Estate of Donald Thornton 
ISSUE 
v. 
Caldor, Inc. 
(Docket No. 83-1158) 
Argued November 7,1984 
There has been great confusion and division among 
judges and constitutional scholars concerning whether 
the two Religion Clauses of the First Amendment speak 
either to different-possibly competing-ideals, or to a 
unified vision of religious liberty. Thonzton v. Caldor,lnc., 
will provide important insights into this issue. In Thorn-
ton, the Supreme Court will determine whether the state 
of Connecticut can constitutionally compel private em-
ployers to give religious employees whatever day off 
each designates as a Sabbath. 
The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... " These provi-
sions were made applicable to the states through a 1940 
Supreme Court derision, Cantwell v. Connecticut, (310 
U.S. 296 ( 1940)). For the most part, these constitutional 
provisions raise distinct issues. Yet, when government 
seeks to accommodate 1 \:ous practice, both Establish-
ment Clause and Free Exercise Clause values are impli-
cated. Unlike previous accommodation cases, Tlwmton 
raises both the knotty issues of the scope of permisssible 
government intervention into the affairs of private sec-
tor employers and the ability of the state to limit a reli-
gious accommodation to Sabbath observers. 
The wall separating church and state has been heat-
edly discussed recently. Clearly, the state has a legitimate 
interest in enacting antidiscrimination laws which pro-
tect religious liberty. On the other hand, the state is 
guilty of a grave constitutional offense when it singles 
out and places its imprimatur on particular types of 
religious practice. The Tlwmton case stands in the mid-
dle of'these two conflicting principles: the Connecticut 
law protects Sabbath worship (a permissible end) at the 
expense of nonobservers (an impermissible end) who 
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may bear the brunt of the Connecticut law through 
greater weekend work obligations. 
FACTS 
Connecticut law provides: "No person who states 
that a particular day of the week is observed as his 
Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on 
such day .... No employer may, as a prerequisite to 
employment, inquire whether the applicant observes 
any Sabbath." Donald Thornton, a manager at a Caldor 
retail store, invoked this statutory provision in an effort 
to attend Sunday Presbyterian services. Caldor refused 
to honor this request. Instead, they offered to transfer 
him to a distant store that was closed on Sundays or to 
demote him to a nonsupervisory position-which would 
not involve Sunday work but would have substantially 
reduced Thornton's pay-at the same store. Thornton 
found these alternatives unacceptable, ceased work, and 
filed a grievance with the State Board of Mediation and 
Arbitration. 
The board, finding Thornton's claim of Sunday ob-
servance sincere, ordered Caldor to reinstate him with 
backpay. (The board, however, refused to consider Cal-
dar's challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, 
claiming that it had no authority to pass on the constitu-
tionality of state law.) Caldor sought to vacate the 
board's award before a state trial court. 
The trial court upheld the statute, ruling that: "The 
statute enables the state to protect its citizens from the 
dangers of uninterrupted labor without infringing upon 
any individual's right to practice the religion of his or 
her choice." The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed 
this decision, invalidating the statute. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that the stat-
ute violated all three prongs of the tripartite test ad-
vanced by the Supreme Court to adjudicate 
Establishment Clause cases. This test requires the fol-
lowing: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be 
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; Fi-
nally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion."' (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971)) The Connecticut court 
held that the legislature's "unmistakable purpose" was 
religious and sectarian since only employees with a Sab-
bath day "specifically mandated by the tenets of a parti-
cular religion" can invoke the statute. The court next 
ruled that the Sabbath law "possesses the primary effect 
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of advancing religion," since "[w]orkers who do not 
'observe a Sabbath' may not avail themselves of the bene-
fits provided by the subsection." Finally, the court held 
that the Connecticut law impermissibly entangled gov-
ernment with religion since claims arising under the 
statute involve "an analysis of the particular religious 
practices and will require a decision concerning the 
scope of religious activity which may fairly be labeiled 
'observance of Sabbath.' " 
(In response to this ruling, the Connecticut legisla-
ture enacted a less stringent provision which requires 
that employers "reasonably accommodate" the religious 
observances of their employees only where doing so will 
not cause "undue hardship.'' This enactment parallels 
the religious accommodation provision of federal civil 
rights legislation. Connecticut, however, did not repeal 
the Sabbath law.) 
In its appeal to the Supreme Court, Thornton (and 
the state of Connecticut which intervened in the case) 
urges the Supreme Court to consider the Sabbath law an 
antidiscrimination provision against private discrimina-
tion. Thornton, in support of this claim, emphasized the 
Supreme Court's 1963 Sherbert v. Venzer decision (374 
U.S. 398), a case which held that a Sabbatarian who 
refused to work on Saturdays was entitled to state unem-
ployment benefits under the Free Exercise Clause. In so 
ruling, the Sherbert Court noted that "there is ... enough 
flexibility in the Constitution to permit a legislative judg-
ment accommodating an unemployment compensation 
law to the exercise of religious beliefs.'' Thornton reads 
this, and other Court language, to support Connecticut 
authority "to protect religious observers against being 
compelled to work on the day of the week they observe 
as their Sabbath.'' 
Thornton next suggests that even if the Establish-
ment Clause is implicated, the Court should scrutinize 
this law under a deferential rationality test. Arguing that 
the Sabbath law "simply relieves observant individuals of 
a special burden that is not imposed upon those who 
observe no Sabbath ... ," Thornton suggests that the 
Court should merely see whether the Sabbath law "'ra-
tionally' further(s) the "legitimate, articulated state pur-
pose of accommodating individual religious belief and 
practice.'' 
Caldor vehemently disagrees both with Thornton's 
characterization of Connecticut's law and his suggestion 
that the Court apply a rationality test. For Caldor: "Con-
necticut compels private employers to yield to the Sab-
bath observances of their employees under all 
circumstances, without regard to the hardship or cost 
that this imposes on the employer or other employees." 
Caldor thus argues that the Supreme Court should fol-
low the Connecticut Supreme Court's application of the 
tripartite test and find the Sabbath Law unconstitu-
tional. 
Thornton, however, contends that, even under the 
Issue No.4 
tripartite test, the Sabbath law would pass constitutional 
muster. For Thornton: 1) "There is a significant secular 
purpose in securing equal employment opportunities 
for Sabbath observers ... ; " 2) "The effect of the Connect-
icut law is not to 'benefit' Sabbath observers, but to 
remove a discriminatory hurdle to their equal employ-
ment;" 3) Excessive enhancement is not implicated since 
"[w]hile the law may require the state to determine the 
sincerity of an individual employee's claimed Sabbath 
observance, this involves no more government entangle-
ment with religion than similar inquiries necessary for 
implementing numerous other religious accommoda-
tions which are plainly constitutional.'' 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Thonzton, depending on how the Court chooses to 
resolve the issues before it, may prove to be a significant 
Establishment Clause case. The Supreme Court is yet to 
provide clear guidance on the religious accommodation 
issue; particularly whether the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses speak either to a disjoint or common 
theme. From a legal theory standpoint, Thonzlon could 
prove to change the direction of the law. 
On a more practical level, the Thomton decision will 
help clarify inconsistent court rulings concerning the 
constitutionality of all government laws which have the 
effect of accommodating religious practice. For exam-
ple, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
employers from taking adverse employment actions 
against applicants or employees on the basis of their 
religious observations and practices, including their ob-
servance of a Sabbath, "unless an employer demon-
strates that he is unable to re1sonably accommodate to 
an employee's or prospective employee's religious obser-
vance or practice without undue hardship on the con-
duct of the employer's business.'' Title VII's religious 
accommodation provision would necessarily be found 
constitutional if the Sabbath law is upheld since the 
Sabbath law does not consider undue hardship as a 
mitigating factor. (For this same reason, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court decision could be upheld without neces-
sarily implicating the constitutionality of Title VII.) In 
addition to Title VII, various other federal provisions 
which accommodate religious practice are implicated by 
T/wmton-including allowing religious holidays to fed-
eral employees and exempting consciencio~,.; objectors 
from military service in times of conscription. 
Tlwmlon also speaks to an issue of potentially great 
significance in Establishment Clause litigation-namely, 
whether one challenging the constitutionality or legisla-
tion must demonstrate that implementing the statute 
actually advances religious practice. Caldor did not dem-
onstrate that the Sabbath law did not cause it or its 
employees undue hardship. Conceivably, the Court 
could insist that Caldor proffer such proof before it 
resolves the Establishment Clause issue. If the Court 
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were to do this, several early-1970s Supreme Court deci-
sions which struck down state programs before their 
effects were known would be called into question. The 
Court, however, will probably wait to address this matter 
in Grand Rapids v. Ball (another 1984-85 term Establish-
ment Clause case to be argued December 5, 1984). 
ARGUMENTS 
For Thornton (Counsel of Record, Nathan Lewin, 2555 M 
Street, Nlf, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20037; telephone (202) 
293-6400) 
1. Government efforts to protect the exercise of religion 
against private discrimination do not raise Establish-
ment Clause issues. 
2. If the Establishment Clause is implicated, the Court 
should use a rationality standard. 
3. The Sabbath law satisfies the requiremenls of the 
tripartite test. 
For the State of Connecticut (Counsel of Record, Joseph I. 
Lieberman, P. 0. Bo."< 120, Hariford, CT 06/01 ,· telejJ/wne 
(203) 566-2026) 
1. Supreme Court decisions defining the scope of ap· 
propriate governmental accommodation of religion 
contradict the Connecticut Supreme Court decision. 
2. The Sabbath law satisfies the requirements of the 
tripartite test. 
For Caldor, Inc. (Coumel of Record, Elliott B. Gersten, 23-1 
Pearl Street, Hartford, CT 06108; teleplume (203) 522-
0173) 
~ 
1. The Connecticut Supreme Court corn!ctly held that 
the Sabbath law violates all three prongs of the tripar-
tite test. 
2. Title V 11 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act's religious ac-
commodation provision preempts the Connecticut's 
overly expansive Sabbath law. 
3. Connecticut's recent passage of a religious accommo-
dation law undercuts the need for the Court to review 
Thornton. 
AMICUS BRIEFS 
In Support of Thornton 
Briefs were filed by the United States, the Anti-Defa-
mation League of B'nai B'rith, The Seventh Day Ad-
ventist Church, The National Association of Counties, 
The Council of State Governments, The National Con-
ference of State Legislatures, the National Right to 
Work Legal Defense Fund and Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State. 
In Support ofCaldor 
Briefs were filed by the Connecticut Retail Mer-
chants Association, the Conne~.:ticut Small Business Fed-
eration the AFL-CIO, and the Equal Employment 
Advisory Council [to Employers]. 
Other 
The ACLU filed a brief recommending that the case 
be remanded to the trial court to determine whether 
Caldor or its employees suffered an "undue hardship." 
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